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
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

THE RMA AND THE POST GOLDWATER-NICHOLS WORLD

More Tinkering Ahead for the JCS?

by

Darrell Jenks
FS-01 State Department



A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.


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15 May 1995

Paper directed by
Captain D. Watson
Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

19950822 058



UNCLASSIFIED
Security Classification This Page
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: Unclassified			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: Joint Military Operations Department			
6. Office Symbol: 1C		7. Address: Naval War College, 686 Cushing Rd., Newport, RI 02841-5010	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): THE RMA AND THE POST GOLDWATER-NICHOLS WORLD: More Tinkering Ahead for the JCS (Unclassified)			
9. Personal Authors: Darrell Jenks			
10. Type of Report: Final		11. Date of Report: May 16 1995	
12. Page Count: 19 Pages (including Bibliography) + 51 = 70			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: JCS reform, Joint or General Staff, Combined and Joint training			
15. Abstract: Defense organization reform is a recurrent issue linked to tradeoffs between civilian control and military efficiency. The 'myth of reorganization' complicates efforts at defense reform. This myth springs from a belief in the applicability of quantification to all defense issues, leading to the idea that reorganization is the solution to all of our military problems. An opposing belief holds that inadequacies in our defense system are due to the personalities of the stake holders, and that we should concentrate our efforts on identifying the ablest leaders, rather than tinkering with organizational structures. The 'Revolution in Military Affairs' and the end of the Cold War have changed the nature of our national interests, calling our bipolar defense orientation into question. The evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff System responded to our assumption of international responsibilities and eventually superpower status in a bipolar world. The Goldwater-Nichols Act culminated the cycle of Cold War changes to our defense establishment by addressing the issues of Service Parochialism, Jointness, and the Quality of Military Advice. Our national interests in the post-Cold War would involve new challenges that will inevitably call for adjustments in our National Defense System. More flexibility and adaptation of our planning and analysis organizations to joint and combined operations will be the prime factors in continuing efforts at defense reform.			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
18. Abstract Security Classification: <i>Unclassified</i>			
19. Name of Responsible Individual: Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department			
20. Telephone: (401) 841-3414/4120		21. Office Symbol: 1C	

Security Classification of This Page (Unclassified)

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The Inevitability of Reform

Our system of checks and balances institutionalizes competition at every level of government. Competition in turn fosters organizational change as government structures adapt to changing environments. Reform - in the form of evolutionary change in government organization - is our response to changing pressures. The existence of an American standing army is part of that dynamic: James Madison expressed the fears of the founding fathers when he wrote,

The means of defense against foreign dangers have been always the instruments of tyranny at home.¹

Yet our system is sufficiently adaptable so that with growth and great power status came a standing army, which has protected us against foreign dangers without becoming an instrument of tyranny at home.

Our fascination with technological solutions is another factor in bureaucratic reorganization. There must be a mechanical or bureaucratic fix for every problem! Management specialist David Brown referred to this idea as 'the Myth of Reorganizing:

This particular myth hold that if things are going badly, a reorganization will set them right.²

Reorganization can only go so far in addressing inherent difficulties in our defense policies. Are things indeed going so badly that further tinkering with our defense organization is necessary? If there are problems, are they susceptible to an organizational fix? The personalities of stake holders may be more important than the formal powers of the offices they hold. Reform proposals can also serve as an excellent smokescreen to draw attention away from vested interests that lie at the heart of many problems in defense organization.

The end of the Cold War and technological change are part of the defense

¹ James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (New York: W.W.Norton and Company, 1969), 214.

² David S. Brown, "The Myth of Reorganizing," Journal of Systems Management (June 1979): 6.

reform debate. The organization of the Department of Defense developed in response to the Cold War. Goldwater Nichols was part of the 'old world order' of the Cold War. Will it still function after the collapse of Soviet communism, the slashing of defense budgets, the increasing importance of military operations other than war, and the revolution in military affairs?

Goldwater-Nichols addressed coordination problems between the Services. Did the legislation go far enough? Is the new system sufficiently flexible to permit the kind of joint and combined operations called for in the post-Cold War World? The historical context of the debate should shed some light on these questions.

Defense Reform: A Perennial Topic Since the Civil War

Until the Civil War America fought wars primarily with soldiers drawn from the state militia systems. During the Continental Congress one follower of Thomas Jefferson attempted, "...to limit the regular Army to 300 men."³ Sentiment against a standing army was strong enough during the first decades of the nineteenth century that Andrew Jackson called for the closing of West Point and the disbanding of the regular army.⁴ Conscription, modern weapons, and mobilization of the civilian population in the war effort during the Civil War increased the size and complexity of the defense establishment. The pre-Civil War defense system was no longer adequate for insuring either civilian control or military competency. Retired General Edward Meyer noted that:

The historical context of the problem goes back much further than 1947, to the Civil War when President Lincoln brought into being the 'unified command' which eventually won the war.⁵

³ Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant. (New York: Random House, 1986), 30.

⁴ Joseph Megargee, lecture to the Naval War College 12/14/1994.

⁵ Edward C. Meyer, "The JCS: How Much Reform is Needed?" Armed Forces Journal International (April 1982): 82.

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After the Civil War, the government's immediate concern was demobilization, reconstruction, and the return to 'normalcy' -- as was to happen after World War One and Two. Preparation for future conflict was far from anybody's mind. To the extent that we devoted energy to future conflict, our response after both World Wars was in the 'preventive' mode -- first the creation of the League of Nations, and then the United Nations. There was little thought for the need to consolidate our military system in preparation for future conflict.

One result of widespread criticism of inefficiency during the Spanish-American War was the creation of a staff system to impose order on our military. We needed a permanent defense establishment capable of fulfilling our overseas commitments after acquiring territory and power as a result of that conflict. Secretary of War Elihu Root responded to criticism and new responsibilities by creating a staff system based on his understanding of the Prussian General Staff system. The new staff system conformed to our traditional distrust of standing armies:

In the American tradition, the Act was also carefully worded to give the Chief of Staff the power to 'supervise' but not to 'command'.⁶

Thus the General Staff Act of 1903 marks the beginning of defense reform efforts that continue to the present day. The process has continued along a continuum between traditional distrust of concentrated military power, marked by decentralized military authority subject to civilian checks, to a centralized control system with a General Staff of military officers in charge of administrative and operational matters, and a hand in strategic planning. Changes in domestic politics and our international position have determined the development of the process of reorganization.

The general outlines of the current system came about as a result of ad hoc organization developed by the military to coordinate efforts during World War II. Efforts

⁶ William H. Groening, The Influence of the German Staff on the American General Staff. (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1993), 71.

to improve coordination started before the war with the establishment of a Standing Liaison Committee in 1938.⁷ British preparedness for coordination meetings during the War finally prodded us into the establishment of a Joint Chiefs of Staff. The establishment of a more efficient mechanism for coordinating military efforts between the Services came about not because of interest in either efficiency or effectiveness per se, but in an effort to hold our bureaucratic weight in the 'fight' with the British allies! This bureaucratic logic continues in effect to the present day, when it seems that more energy is put into the fight for bureaucratic supremacy than in the actual struggle with an enemy. This bureaucratic dynamic does not impugn the patriotism of those who sought maximum gain for their Service in these struggles: for the most part the representatives of the Services, whose way of thinking was developed through a career in one branch of the military, were convinced that the way of fighting they knew would serve the nation best. This logic defines the debate on the merits of a 'general' versus a 'joint' staff. Those who feel that the nation is best served by a military authority able to supersede the views of any one Service favor a 'general staff' system, while those who feel that the presentation of the views of each Service to civilian authorities allows for the best choice favor a 'joint staff' system.

Superpower status came with the end of World War II, bringing inescapable responsibilities for the maintenance of world peace. The Defense Act of 1947, which is the direct predecessor the Joint Chiefs of Staff system currently in effect, was our response to the military implications of superpower status. As with the General Staff Act of 1903, the Defense Act was a compromise, "...between those who favored full Service integration and those who feared centralization of military authority."⁸ Each

⁷ Russel F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973), 207.

⁸ David C. Jones, "Why the Joint Chiefs Must Change," Armed Forces Journal International (March 1982):64.

Service fought for a system that would assure primacy, based on the undoubtedly sincere belief that what that Service had to offer would best serve our national security interests. The result was, "...government by committee in the form of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."⁹ As Arthur Hadley put it:

Practically to a man the leaders of all three services-for the Army air Corps was by the close of the war separate and powerful enough to be called a service-ended the war convinced that peace would have come sooner at less cost if they had received the lion's share of men and funds and been allowed to fight the war their way.¹⁰

Far from settling the issues of civilian versus military control, and coordination between the Services, the Defense Act of 1947 merely set the stage for further definition of these problems against the backdrop of the conflicts which followed World War II. Each conflict after the Second World War initiated a cycle of investigation into the causes of problems in the prosecution of hostilities and the search for organizational solutions. The extent to which our government can give the military a free hand in the prosecution of the conflicts upon which we have engaged is only one part of the problem. The nature of our democratic system is responsible for the inevitable recurrence of defense reorganization. A single casualty is one too many, calling inevitably for a 'perfect' military system to resolve our conflicts without the loss of life (at least on our side!).

Revisions in the Defense Act of 1947 after the Korean War focused on perennial issues of economics and the inefficiencies of a joint system tailored to preserve civilian control and prevent centralization of military power. The 1953 report of the Rockefeller Committee on DoD Organization stated:

The organization of the Department must be able to effect maximum economies without injuring military strength and its necessary productive support.¹¹

The financial strains of maintaining a defense establishment commensurate

⁹ Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949), 60.

¹⁰ Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant (New York: Random House, 1986), 33.

¹¹ John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner, The Legal Structure of Defense Organization (Washington, D.C.: President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986), 20.

with our post WWII responsibilities added another issue to those of civilian versus military control and centralization of command authority that had informed the debate on reorganization from the General Staff Act of 1903 to the National Security Act of 1947: the need to economize. Financial constraints further complicated the traditional debate, for now those arguing in favor of centralization had an additional argument beyond the lives that greater military efficiency might save, namely, the need to make the military more efficient so as not to ruin the very system our military is to protect. President Eisenhower's efforts at reorganization were based on the need to economize. His reliance on nuclear weapons as opposed to conventional forces was based on the belief that nuclear deterrence was affordable. Thus the need to economize led to a direct relationship between the nation's military strategy and the nature of our defense organization. Difficult though the question of how best to defend ourselves was, we would now have to worry not only about what was necessary for our defense, but also about what was affordable.

Robert McNamara and the application of systems analysis was an inevitable byproduct of the need to economize. It is perhaps unfair to lay all the blame for the ills of an excessively quantitative approach to defense management at McNamara's feet. With our assumption of global responsibilities Paul Kennedy's arguments about 'imperial overstretch' came into play:

...whether, in the military/strategical realm, it can preserve a reasonable balance between the nation's perceived defense requirements and the means it possesses to maintain those commitments.¹²

McNamara's management philosophy marks the large-scale introduction of private-sector management practices to DoD:

His philosophy was that the same procedures and management techniques used by large corporations could, if properly applied, be used to effectively manage the Department of Defense.¹³

¹² Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 514.

¹³ Mark T. Seeley, The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act of 1986: Genesis and Postscript (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School AD-A193 286, 1988), 22.

Whatever the merits of a business-management approach to our National Defense, one result has been the addition of yet another layer of complexity to the increasingly complicated set of factors that affect DoD: constitutional issues of civilian versus military control, control and command issues within the military, an increasing emphasis on economical use of resources after WWII, and with the introduction of Business Management came a 'private-sector' approach to efficiencies. The end result has been increasing confusion about the relationship between efficiency and effectiveness, to the point where efficient use of resources may be completely divorced from attaining original objectives.

As in previous cycles of reform, military reformers sought the answer in reorganization. The effects of McNamara's management practices and the Vietnam War led to a prolonged debate on military reform that culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. A General Accounting Office review summed up the intended impact of the Act: to improve the quality of military advice to the President, NSC, and the Secretary of Defense, and to give the unified combatant commanders the authority and influence needed to successfully carry out their missions.¹⁴ The legislation sought to achieve these aims by centralizing authority in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and increasing Unified Combatant Commander input into the acquisition and budget process. The motivation behind the Goldwater-Nichols Act, as with previous military legislation was the belief that there is a direct relation between performance and organization.

Some who opposed the legislation argued that the issues of advice and unified combatant authority were more closely linked to the personalities of the officeholders than to organizational structure. There was a certain amount of fatalism and realism in this attitude. Constant efforts to improve our military system by legislative means

¹⁴ General Accounting Office, Defense Reorganization (Washington, D.C.: GAO/NSIAD-89-83, 1989), 1.

naturally led to bureaucratic resistance, whether because of threats to established powers and ways of doing business, or because of the perception that the organization exists not to serve any purpose other than to reform itself! Other critics felt the legislation did not address the root causes of the ostensibly poor advice and relative ineffectiveness of the unified combatant commanders, which they claim lay in the very existence of separate services. The Act was supposed to overcome the divided loyalties of members of the JCS who were simultaneously representing national and service interests by investing the Chairman with more authority to present 'unified' advice to the President, the NSC, Congress and the Secretary of Defense.

Still others felt that Goldwater-Nichols went too far:

Navy concerns have centered on the contention that only through a competitive process (the cornerstone of the American political system of checks and balances) can all Defense viewpoints and options be fully aired and considered, and an over centralization of power would only serve to reduce the options available to civilian authority.¹⁵

Immediately after the passage of the legislation commentators such as Robert Previdi painted an alarming picture of over centralization:

It is the most important piece of military legislation passed by Congress in the last forty years. It is also the most dangerous.¹⁶

Previdi goes on the state:

Few Americans know anything about the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which represents the first potential challenge to civilian control of the military in the history of the United States.¹⁷

Perhaps some of the proponents of the legislation would be pleased to see such power ascribed to their efforts! For better or worse, nine years after passage of the Act, the consensus seems to be that Goldwater-Nichols has neither eliminated civilian control nor the problems of inefficiency and divided advice, though many have argued that the legislation has taken an important step in the right direction. Ironically

¹⁵ Mark T. Seeley, The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act of 1986: Genesis and Postscript (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School AD-A193 286, 1988), 48.

¹⁶ Robert Previdi, Civilian Control Versus Military Rule (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1988), 9.

¹⁷ Ibid. 10.

enough, Previdi's argument shares much in common with the proponents of the 'personality driven' approach to military reform. This approach holds that institutional structures are less important than the personalities involved. Previdi argues that Goldwater-Nichols sufficiently weakens institutional checks so that an ambitious general (such as General Scott, the fictional CJCS who attempts to take over the US government in Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey II's Seven Days in May [New York: Harper & Row, 1962]), could threaten civilian control of the US government. Hence opportunistic predators would be able to take advantage of the system. Unfortunately, 'opportunistic predators' will find ways to make trouble regardless of the institutional constraints within which they operate. One wonders if General MacArthur would have disobeyed orders if a stronger JCS had advised President Truman to make the parameters of the mission in Korea clear from the outset.

The Goldwater-Nichols Cure: Parochialism, Jointness, and Quality of Advice

As cited in the GAO study above, the intent of Congress in Goldwater-Nichols was to address the problems of inefficiency and quality of advice. The most obvious manifestation of these problems has been in service parochialism. The Act has strengthened the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although it is still not clear that he has the authority to overrule opposing opinions of the Service Chiefs, who still have institutional means of raising objections.

The legislative promotion of 'jointness' has been effective in at least raising awareness of the problems of parochialism. Together with intensive studies of problems caused by poor inter-Service coordination during military operations in Iran, Grenada, and Panama all senior military leaders at least pay public lip-service to the idea of jointness, and acceptance of the need for greater coordination is evident in the

lower ranks. There certainly does not seem to have been any reduction in capability as a result of Goldwater-Nichols, as predicted by Previdi and others:

...to assume that joint operations are the key to everything ignores the fact that joint operations depend foremost on strong air, ground, and naval capability.¹⁸

Budget-cutting is bound to raise the issue again, as the Services find themselves in increasingly strong competition for dwindling resources. The next round of defense reform proposals may well find us considering the question of whether any mechanism short of a unified service is sufficiently strong to force agreement between Services which perceive budget cuts as having exceeded the point at which the national security can be guaranteed.

Congress sought to improve the quality of military advice by legislating centralization of authority in the Chairman, so that he would present a unified view to civilian superiors. General Meyers raised the issue as follows:

Will an enhanced voice for the Chairman affect the ability of the Services to make Service views known to the Secretary of Defense and Congress?¹⁹

There is little debate on this issue today. Perhaps the locus for the most vicious inter-Service budgetary battles has simply shifted (as many feared it would!) from the relatively public arena of the Joint Chiefs to other less well-known venues within the bureaucratic structure of the Pentagon. The size of the defense establishment is such that what President Roosevelt once remarked of the Navy seems true of the entire establishment--that it is like a feather pillow; if you punch it down in one place, it simply pops up in another.

Defense Reform: The Next Round

¹⁸ Ibid. 152.

¹⁹ Edward C. Meyer, "The JCS: How Much Reform is Needed?" Armed Forces Journal (April 1982), 88.

Perhaps it is appropriate to borrow Clausewitz's concept of a culminating point of victory to describe the position of Goldwater-Nichols in the Cold War cycle of defense reform. The Soviet threat provided the background for the intensive studies and legislation from the National Security Act of 1947 to Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. Discussion of issues of civilian control and efficiency versus effectiveness were part of the question of national survival in the face of communist expansion. Now that the Soviet threat is gone, what next?

The most salient question will be the peacetime function of the military. The Cold War distorted the traditional debate over the appropriate role of a standing army during peacetime precisely because there was no 'peacetime'. Though it may have been 'cold', no amount of revisionist history can eliminate the perception of a threat to our way of life during the Cold War. President Eisenhower cast the debate in terms of protecting our way of life without destroying it by excessive diversion of resources and authority to the military establishment. Nonetheless, he was fully aware of the existence of a threat, and saw nuclear deterrence as the means of protecting against it without 'breaking the bank of democracy'.

Cynics claim that our post-Cold War military is now in search of a mission. Some perceive talk of an anti-drug war, military operations other than war, humanitarian operations and the like as justification of defense budgets in the face of a changed threat environment. Historians point out the disastrous consequences in terms of loss of life and resources that resulted from dramatic post-conflict downsizing of the military after previous conflicts. Once again we are faced by the perennial problem of avoiding lack of preparedness without spending money for a defense establishment we cannot afford. It is only a matter of time until the defense reorganization cure becomes a focus of the debate.

The Goldwater-Nichols system has managed the initial phases of downsizing.

The question is whether our system will be able to make the difficult resource allocation decisions that further budget cuts will entail. The resilience of the organizational structures we have created to handle military issues is only one part of the equation. The changing nature of the international environment is an equally critical factor. We cannot consider efficiency and effectiveness in a vacuum, as if the Department of Defense operated without having to react to changes in the world situation.

Unfortunately, emphasis on a business-management approach to defense can lead to this trap. For better or worse, failure is an intrinsic possibility for any business venture. Bankruptcy laws exist precisely because any business venture may fail, and our society needs to take that possibility into account in order to assure the minimum level of social harmony necessary to maintain a functioning society. But what about our national defense? Is failure an intrinsic factor in considerations of defense organization? Is there a military equivalent of 'bankruptcy laws' to take up the slack in case of failure?

This is not a problem limited to considerations of our military establishment. Every department of our federal government is faced with these questions in the current climate of budgetary stringency. The U.S. National Performance Review stated the need for service-orientation throughout the Federal Government.²⁰ In 1993, Management Specialist F. Foley defined service-orientation in terms of an inherent conflict in the role of personnel officers in the Federal Government: whether to focus on enforcement of rules and regulations, or whether to place greater importance on behaviors designed to maximize organizational efficiency. Foley concluded that Federal Personnel Managers need to emulate the service-orientation of the private

²⁰ U.S. National Performance Review. (1993). Creating a government that works better & costs less. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

sector by paying more attention to rewarding behaviors that increase organizational effectiveness and less attention to punishing infractions of regulations.²¹ Other researchers have disagreed with the assumption that public sector management jobs can be defined in terms of service-orientation. Entrepreneurial government as defined by the National Performance Review ignored basic conflicts between the roles of the personnel manager in the public and private sectors. R. Moe defined an administrative government paradigm as the congressionally legislated system designed to insure proper use of public funds and distinguished this paradigm from the entrepreneurial management paradigm designed to maximize profits in the private sector. Moe questioned the acceptance of similarity between management in the public and private sectors commonly accepted in management writing.²²

We should take these considerations into account before proceeding with application of McNamara style systems analysis and business management principles to our military in the belief that organizational cures will solve fundamental problems of national strategy. The temptation is clear: since we have fewer resources to devote to the national defense, and since the overwhelming nature of the Soviet threat is no longer salient, we should be able to preserve our current force structure by wringing every possible inefficiency out of the system through correct use of business practices. The point is that no attack on waste, fraud and mismanagement, no matter how concerted, will suffice to replace strategic and operational thinking.

The attractions of the organizational cure have led to the curiously reactionary nature of many proposals for change connected with the revolution in military affairs. It is intriguing to see how new technologies and trendy thinking about the nature of warfare are used as justification for budgets and organizations. The Toffler's

²¹ F. Foley, "Federal Personnel Offices: Time for Change?" Public Personnel Management (22, 4), 648.

²² R. Moe, "The 'Reinventing Government' exercise: Misinterpreting the Problem, Misjudging the Consequences," Public Administration Review (54, 2), 122.

conception of 'waves of war' is a case in point. The dangers and opportunities of 'information war' that Alvin and Heidi Toffler discuss in their book War and Anti-War are considered within the context of the digitalized battlefield and new concepts of battlespace management and interoperability, rather than as important ideas that call our entire strategic and operational culture into question. It is ironic that the more 'revolutionary' the concept, the more 'reactionary' our thinking tends to be.

The post-Soviet threat to our nation should put these issues into clearer context. If we accept the transnational nature of many threats to our security -- such as narcotics trafficking, terrorism, the failure of decolonization in Africa and Eastern Europe, etc. -- then logic, and budgetary stringency, compels a transnational response. The Clinton administration's initial emphasis on UN and multilateral peacekeeping operations followed from this line of reasoning. The additional strategic choices, and money-saving opportunities, afforded by multilateral responses to international security threats are an attractive solution to some of our current defense problems.

From the perspective of military organization, our thinking along multilateral lines has failed to take into account the importance of the traditional American debate about efficiency versus effectiveness and civilian control in these issues. The transnational threats of the post-Soviet world are not strictly military in any traditional sense. Not that it ever made sense to consider security issues as purely military, as Clausewitz made clear with his famous dictum that war is 'politics by other means'. The point is that any search for an 'organizational cure' to our defense problems should take into account the salience of inter-agency and combined operation issues. Perhaps we should frame the post-Goldwater-Nichols debate on defense reorganization in terms of these two factors, rather than rehashing traditional questions of Service parochialism and quality of advice.

One of the lessons from our intervention in Panama was the need for better inter-agency cooperation during every phase of our military operations. Commander B. Paulmier, a French student at the Naval War College pointed out that, "Lack of standing interagency work in planning and the relations between the military leaders and the civilians on the scene has not really changed in the regulations since Panama."²³ Perhaps we should extend the logic of Goldwater-Nichols emphasis on 'jointness' beyond the Department of Defense, to include not just other Departments within the United States Government, but agencies of other governments as well. In other words, jointness in the post-Soviet world should not refer just to inter-Service affairs, but to inter-agency and combined operations as well.

This dynamic is clearly already at work. A Washington Post article of 28 January 1993 pointed out that:

Aspin's blueprint represent the most dramatic redefinition of top Pentagon positions in more than 15 years and appears likely to give the Defense Department a broader - or even a leading - role in matters that have long been the province of policy makers at the State Department.²⁴

These are the issues that should frame debate over the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in defense policy: the nature of the security threat, and the type of response required. We shall miss the point if we believe that reorganization of the Department of Defense will allow us to address issues that fall outside the purview of that organization. I believe that we should consider Commander Paulmier's helpful suggestion in an expanded context -- that of interagency and combined responses to security threats.

²³ Commander Bruno Paulmier, interview by author, Newport, RI, 24 April 1995.

²⁴ Jeffrey R. Smith, "Defense Policy Posts Restructured." The Washington Post 28 January 1993, A4.

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APPENDIX

- A: Sample Questionnaire submitted to NCC Students
- B: Summary of Responses
- C: Individual Responses
- D: Summary of Telephone Interview with Office of Legal Counsel

in the JCS.

March 25, 1995

Naval War College
Newport, RI

Dear Colleague:

This questionnaire is designed to study aspects of the problem of civilian control versus military efficiency in military command structure. I hope that the information you provide will lead to a better understanding of this issue.

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.

Yours truly,

Darrell Jenks

CONTROL VERSUS EFFICIENCY: JOINT OR GENERAL STAFF

SECTION ONE: ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND AUTHORITY

1. Do your Armed Forces have a Joint or a General Staff system?
2. Does your Staff Organization have command authority, administrative authority, does it serve as a chief military advisor to the government (as is the case in the U.S.) or some combination of the above?
3. What is the administrative relationship between the highest military authority and the government in the political system in your country?

SECTION TWO: REFORM

1. Are there any moves to reform the command system you described above?
2. Does the emphasis in your system fall on civilian control or military efficiency? Do you perceive a need to change the balance? Are there any moves to change the balance.
3. Does the balance between control and efficiency affect the completion of the mission of your Armed Forces?

SECTION THREE: THE U.S. SYSTEM

1. Given the American NSS and NMS, do you think the U.S. has the optimal military command structure to achieve our objectives?
2. Are there any aspects of command organization which you think would improve the American command structure?
3. Do you think that a General Staff System would better accomplish the mission of the U.S. Armed Forces than the Joint Staff System currently in place?

CONTROL VERSUS EFFICIENCY: JOINT OR GENERAL STAFF

SECTION ONE: ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND AUTHORITY

1. Do your Armed Forces have a Joint or a General Staff system?

Denmark: Basically a 'general staff' type system under civilian control -- the Chief of Defense is a civilian bureaucrat.

Argentina: Has a Joint Chief of Staff comprising elements of the 3 armed services.

Venezuela: JCS

India: General Staff

Turkey: General Staff

South Africa: The Chief of the SANDF has a General Staff. Checks and balances to prevent abuse of military power were put in place through the creation of a Defense Secretariat.

France: Joint Staff System. The President of the French Republic, directly elected since 1962, is the Chief of the Armed Forces. The Prime Minister, nominated by the President and responsible to the Parliament, is in charge of Defense Policy. The Highest military authority is the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, under the Defense Minister's administrative authority.

Sweden: Joint Staff. The HQ consists of a joint operational staff, a Navy, army, air force staff, military intelligence and security and a staff support department.

Finland: General Staff

Spain: Joint Staff (6 May 1995 Interview)

2. Does your Staff Organization have command authority, administrative authority, does it serve as a chief military advisor to the government (as is the case in the U.S.) or some combination of the above?

Denmark: Civilian Chief of Defense has 'Full Command' over military forces (operational as well as administrative).

Delegates operational command to the respective services operational HQs.

Argentina: The EMC (JCS) plans and advises.

Venezuela: The EMC advises, the forces have operational command

India: General Staff advises, command authority within the services

Turkey: The General Staff has command authority. "...Turkey is in need of powerful and 'high readiness forces', and 'deterrence' is very important issue'. So, Chief of General Staff is directly under the Prime Minister."

South Africa: The General Staff advises under the Defense Command Council. Service Staff organizations have administrative authority.

France: The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces has operational authority upon all forces. More than a senior advisor to the govt., he is also the senior military leader involved in all operations.

Sweden: It has both command and admin authority.

Finland: Both command and administrative authority. Chief military advisor to the govt. is the defense council and Ministry of Defense.

Spain: It has command authority for the missions assigned by the government, at the same time the Joint Staff is the chief advisor to the government on military matters.

3. What is the administrative relationship between the highest military authority and the government in the political system in your country?

Denmark: Civilian Chief of Defense is subordinate to Civilian Minister of Defense on both administrative and operational issues.

Argentina: As Commander in Chief, the President is the locus of administrative and operational control

Venezuela: As with Argentina, administrative and operational control rest in the Commander in Chief, the President. There are medium range plans to make the Minister of Defense civilian. (Will there be a devolution of authority from the Commander in Chief in that case?)

India: Chiefs of Staff of the services deal with the Defense Minister * Cabinet Secretary -- senior civilian bureaucrats

Turkey: Chief of General Staff directly under Prime Minister

South Africa: The administrative relationship is presently under redefinition due to the establishment of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At this stage it is foreseen that the Secretary of Defense will advise the President on policy.

France: Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces is nominated by President, takes orders from Defense Minister (responsible to Parliament). For operational responsibilities, reports to President.

Sweden: the Supreme Commander is subordinate to the Govt.(DoD). All admin from the Gov to the services passes through the Supreme Commander.

Finland: CINC of the Defense Forces works on same level of the govt. as the Minister of Defense.

Spain: The Defense Minister is the maximum authority on military matters, and can delegate authority. During times of peace, the Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa (JEMAD--Chief of the Defense Staff) does not have direct authority over the Service Chiefs, except as delegated by the Minister. The JEMAD is somewhat like a CINC, except that at certain times he may receive extra authority from the Minister of Defense.

SECTION TWO: REFORM

1. Are there any moves to reform the command system you described above?

Denmark: No

Argentina: No, previous reforms are still in place

Venezuela: No, but we are undertaking joint operations

India: A National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff concept is under consideration

Turkey: No, but sometimes we discuss the hierarchy of our Chief of General Staff

South Africa: The newly-formed Secretariat of Defense might be the generator for new ideas on command relationships in the SANDF.

France: No specific moves, but, the last five years have seen significant increase in Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces' powers because current Chief, Admiral Lanxade, with strong political support, has chosen to fulfill more completely his role. Creation of planning headquarters and new joint staff course are examples of trend.

Sweden: It was reformed as recently as 1994.

Finland: No

Spain: No, our latest reform was done 5 years ago.

2. Does the emphasis in your system fall on civilian control or military efficiency? Do you perceive a need to change the balance? Are there any moves to change the balance.

Denmark: Our system strikes a proper balance.

Argentina: There is absolute civilian control since the assumption of a democratic government

India: Civilian control where financial implications are involved. Military efficiency is a service purview. More decentralization preferred.

Turkey: Yes, the emphasis is on civilian control.

South Africa: At present the emphasis falls more on military efficiency, the balance will change as the newly formed Secretariat of Defense establishes itself. In fact it has already started to shift. It is, however, not foreseen that the concepts of civilian control and military efficiency will become mutually exclusive, but that a healthy balance will be strived for.

France: The Defense minister now has more influence vis-a-vis the Foreign Affairs Minister -- as seen in military preference for participation in Alliance military structure.

Sweden: The 1994 reforms ensured better military efficiency as the service chiefs' power was reduced in favor of the Supreme Commander. We now have full civilian control and an improved military efficiency.

Finland: No

Spain: After our Civil War and forty years of dictatorship our emphasis has been on civilian control. This has been the strength of our system -- smooth transition to civilian control.

3. Does the balance between control and efficiency affect the completion of the mission of your Armed Forces?

Denmark: Of course, certain missions could be accomplished more effectively from a purely military standpoint without controls, but insofar as control serves to maintain public support to the military, it is no problem.

Argentina: No, on the contrary, I believe that control increases efficiency.

India: Yes, mainly adversely

South Africa: At present the balance between control and efficiency is causing the military to redefine its strategies for the future, and its priorities in missions and systems.

France: Involvement of political leaders in low level details hampered efficiency. But flexibility of Armed Forces is a plus.

Sweden: No, not in military ops.

Finland: Yes

Spain: No, because the JEMAD has sufficient influence over the military decisions of the civilian government.

SECTION THREE: THE U.S. SYSTEM

1. Given the American NSS and NMS, do you think the U.S. has the optimal military command structure to achieve our objectives?

Argentina: I believe that though very large the structure is efficient

Venezuela: Too large though well structured. Reduce personnel without damaging organizational structure.

India: Yes if you wish to remain globally engaged.

Turkey: Yes

South Africa: Within the constraints of a bulky political system which prevents an optimum and consistent policy, the present command structure is probably the optimum if there is a common bias between the key players.

France: US system puts many more constraints upon the executive branch (e.g., work of the roles and missions commission), which weakens ability of armed forces to respond to any request. The French system is very flexible and responsive, even too much.

Sweden: No.

Finland: Yes, but it is a little bit too complicated and very bureaucratic.

Spain: Yes, 5 CINCs with geographic responsibilities presents appropriate military options. There will always be competing interests, and the current system does about as good a job as possible of resolving these conflicts.

2. Are there any aspects of command organization which you think would improve the American command structure?

Denmark: ...to me it seems to be a complex, man power demanding system. What seems to me to be one of your biggest problems is one inherent in your political system - the inevitable (?) hunt for pork for the constituencies. And the role of the Service Secretaries - are they beneficial?

Argentina: The problem in all countries is not the structure but rather the will on the part of the forces to act jointly.

India: The Joint Chiefs of Staff should have some representation in the National Command Authority.

Turkey: No, it's sufficient

South Africa: No.

France: Main weakness - lack of flexibility. **Lack of standing interagency work in planning and the relations between the military leaders and the civilians on the scene have not really changed in the regulations since Panama.** In the US, the President alone is in charge of inter-agency coordination. The French bicameral system, clearly giving this responsibility to the Prime Minister, offers a great freedom to the President in his so called 'domaine reserve'.

Sweden: A more formalized power base for the CJCS and JCS.

Finland: It should be more simplified and flexible.

Spain: No

3. Do you think that a General Staff System would better accomplish the mission of the U.S. Armed Forces than the Joint Staff System currently in place?

Argentina: It is always possible to improve joint actions on the part of the Armed Forces, including Police forces, since not much has been done on this score to date - on the contrary, there have been redundant forces in all joint actions.

Venezuela: Only increasing the representation of the Joint Staff at the highest levels. For me the Joint Staff has sufficient support to reach objectives

India: No. The Joint Staff system appears to be appropriate for the global unified command structure.

Turkey: I don't think so.

South Africa: Yes, in the short term. However the same argument which influenced Nimitz at the end of WWII is probably still deeply ingrained on the way the U.S. thinks it should fight tomorrow.

Sweden: No.

Finland: No. If you think about the missions and roles of the U.S. Armed Forces, in my opinion the Joint Staff System is excellent.

Spain: No

DENMARK.

March 25, 1995

Naval War College
Newport, RI

Dear Colleague:

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Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.

Yours truly,

Darrell Jenks

Dear Darrell,

In order to answer your Q's about the Danish system I refer to the enclosed organigrams:

- 1) The minister of Defence, a civilian, is the link between Government, Parliament and Defence, and thus refers to relevant Governmental and Parliamentary committees. (Decisions on war, peace, support to UN, mobilization, procurement, budget etc). His principal advisor on defence matters is the Head of the Department of Defence (a civil servant). Formally, the Chief of Defence does not have direct access to the minister - only via Head of DoD. Roughly, manning of DoD is $\frac{2}{3}$ civilian, $\frac{1}{3}$ military.
- 2) HQ Chief of Defence is a joint services (army, navy, air) HQ. manning is roughly 85% military, 15% civilian (I do not have exact data). Chief of Defence, his Chief of Staff and 5 Flag rank deputies are drawn from the 3 services - principally the best qualified. Deputy for C&I systems is a civilian. They all have to be approved by the Government, but we do not have hearings as you do in the US. Lower echelon assignments are distributed between the services, and staff members in the ranks of commander, major and above will have attended the 3-service Staff College (~9 months). In terms of staff members HQ Chief of Defence is roughly 3 times as large as Department of Defence. Chief of Defence is responsible for readiness, training and forwards associate plans, budgets, procurement proposals etc to Department of Defence for acknowledgement as requisite.

....

CONTROL VERSUS EFFICIENCY: JOINT OR GENERAL STAFF

SECTION ONE: ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND AUTHORITY

1. Do your Armed Forces have a Joint or a General Staff system?
2. Does your Staff Organization have command authority, administrative authority, does it serve as a chief military advisor to the government (as is the case in the U.S.) or some combination of the above?
3. What is the administrative relationship between the highest military authority and the government in the political system in your country?

SECTION TWO: REFORM

1. Are there any moves to reform the command system you described above? *NO, not to my knowledge.*
2. Does the emphasis in your system fall on civilian control or military efficiency? Do you perceive a need to change the balance? Are there any moves to change the balance. *In my opinion the system strikes a proper balance, and I am not aware of moves to change*
3. Does the balance between control and efficiency affect the completion of the mission of your Armed Forces? *Of course, certain missions could be accomplished more effectively from a purely military standpoint without controls, but insofar as control serves to maintain public support to the military, it is no problem.*


SECTION THREE: THE U.S. SYSTEM

1. Given the American NSS and NMS, do you think the U.S. has the optimal military command structure to achieve our objectives?
2. Are there any aspects of command organization which you think would improve the American command structure?
3. Do you think that a General Staff System would better accomplish the mission of the U.S. Armed Forces than the Joint Staff System currently in place?


I would hesitate to comment on section 3, because I do not know enough about it to do so with any confidence. Though, to me it seems to be a complex, manpower demanding system. What seems to me to be one of your biggest problems is one inherent in your political system - the inevitable (?) hunt for pork for the constituencies. And the role of the Service Secretaries - are they beneficial?

Hope this is useful - sempre paratus for additional info.

Regards Vagh




Danish Defence Organization






HEADQUARTERS CHIEF OF DEFENCE DENMARK





Organization of The Armed Forces



March 25, 1995

Naval War College
Newport, RI

Dear Colleague:

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Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.

Yours truly,

Darrell Jenks

GUILLERMO DONALDE (ARGENTINA)

CONTROL VERSUS EFFICIENCY: JOINT OR GENERAL STAFF

SECTION ONE: ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND AUTHORITY

1. Do your Armed Forces have a Joint or a General Staff system?

Si, nuestro país tiene un Estado Mayor General.

2. Does your Staff Organization have command authority, administrative authority, does it serve as a chief military advisor to the government (as is the case in the U.S.) or some combination of the above?

El EMG es un órgano de asesoramiento y asesoramiento.

3. What is the administrative relationship between the highest military authority and the government in the political system in your country?

El presidente es el comandante en jefe de las FF.AA.

SECTION TWO: REFORM

1. Are there any moves to reform the command system you described above?

No, no se ve ninguna necesidad de reformar el sistema.

2. Does the emphasis in your system fall on civilian control or military efficiency? Do you perceive a need to change the balance? Are there any moves to change the balance.

El control de la política del sistema político, el control de la política.

3. Does the balance between control and efficiency affect the completion of the mission of your Armed Forces?

No, pero se ve que el control es necesario.

SECTION THREE: THE U.S. SYSTEM

1. Given the American NSS and NMS, do you think the U.S. has the optimal military command structure to achieve our objectives?

Lo que, por lo que se ve, la estructura es una buena estructura.

2. Are there any aspects of command organization which you think would improve the American command structure?

El problema, en todo el mundo, no es la estructura sino la voluntad de actuar en forma conjunta.

3. Do you think that a General Staff System would better accomplish the mission of the U.S. Armed Forces than the Joint Staff System currently in place?

Siempre es posible mejorar el actual conjunto de los grupos de trabajo y hacer de seguridad, pero no se ve mucho lo que falta de hacer, y por el contrario en todas las operaciones conjuntas aparecen veces o incluso superpuestas.

Conociendo su capacidad en el idioma español, mucho más cómodo en mi lenguaje.

ONE

1. Si', el Estado Mayor Conjunto.
2. Es un organo de consulta o asesoria, las fuerzas se manejan independientemente
3. El presidente es el comandante en jefe de las FFAN, es previsto que a mediano plazo el Ministro de la Defensa sea tambien un civil.

Section Two.

No esta prevista ninguna reforma, si se estan implementando comando Operativos en forma conjunta; si es afectado en multiple ocasiones.

THREE

- Organizado grande, pero bien estructurado. Significa, reducir personal pero mantener el organograma.
- Solo aumentando la representacion del Joint Staff en los altos niveles y disminuyendo las individuales.

March 25, 1995

Naval War College
Newport, RI

Dear Colleague:

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Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.

Yours truly,

Darrell Jenks

CONTROL VERSUS EFFICIENCY: JOINT OR GENERAL STAFF

SECTION ONE: ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND AUTHORITY

1. Do your Armed Forces have a Joint or a General Staff system?

GENERAL STAFF

2. Does your Staff Organization have command authority, administrative authority, does it serve as a chief military advisor to the government (as is the case in the U.S.) or some combination of the above?

3. What is the administrative relationship between the highest military authority and the government in the political system in your country?
 COMMAND AUTHORITY WITHIN THE SERVICE. ADVISE TO THE GOVERNMENT ON SECURITY ISSUES.

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE RESPECTIVE SERVICES DEAL WITH THE DEFENCE MINISTER (POLITICIAN) &

SECTION TWO: REFORM THE CABINET SECRETARY / DEFENCE SECRETARY WHO ARE THE SENIORMOST BUREAUCRATS IN THE GOVT

1. Are there any moves to reform the command system you described above?

A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL and JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CONCEPT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

2. Does the emphasis in your system fall on civilian control or military efficiency? Do you perceive a need to change the balance? Are there any moves to change the balance.

3. Does the balance between control and efficiency affect the completion of the mission of your Armed Forces?
 CIVILIAN CONTROL WHERE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS ARE INVOLVED. MILITARY EFFICIENCY IS A SERVICE PRIORITY. MORE DECENTRALISATION PREFERRED

YES - MAINLY ADVERSELY.

SECTION THREE: THE U.S. SYSTEM

1. Given the American NSS and NMS, do you think the U.S. has the optimal military command structure to achieve our objectives?

YES IF YOU WISH TO REMAIN GLOBALLY ENGAGED

2. Are there any aspects of command organization which you think would improve the American command structure?

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SHOULD HAVE SOME REPRESENTATION IN THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY.

3. Do you think that a General Staff System would better accomplish the mission of the U.S. Armed Forces than the Joint Staff System currently in place?

NO. THE JOINT STAFF SYSTEM APPEARS TO BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE GLOBAL UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE.

S. R. BHABHA
(CAPT S BHABHA)
INDIAN NAVY / NCC

March 25, 1995

Naval War College
Newport, RI

Dear Colleague:

This questionnaire is designed to study aspects of the problem of civilian control versus military efficiency in military command structure. I hope that the information you provide will lead to a better understanding of this issue.

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.

Yours truly,

Darrell Jenks

*Filled out by
Capt Wilmer ALLER
Turkish Navy
04 April 1995*

CONTROL VERSUS EFFICIENCY: JOINT OR GENERAL STAFF

SECTION ONE: ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND AUTHORITY

1. Do your Armed Forces have a Joint or a General Staff system?

General Staff system.

2. Does your Staff Organization have command authority, administrative authority, does it serve as a chief military advisor to the government (as is the case in the U.S.) or some combination of the above?

Have Command authority.

3. What is the administrative relationship between the highest military authority and the government in the political system in your country?

Our Chief of General Staff is directly under the Prime Minister

SECTION TWO: REFORM

1. Are there any moves to reform the command system you described above?

No, but sometimes we discuss the hierarchy of our
Chief of Gen. Staff

2. Does the emphasis in your system fall on civilian control or military efficiency? Do you perceive a need to change the balance? Are there any moves to change the balance.

Yes the emphasis is on civilian control.

3. Does the balance between control and efficiency affect the completion of the mission of your Armed Forces?

SECTION THREE: THE U.S. SYSTEM

1. Given the American NSS and NMS, do you think the U.S. has the optimal military command structure to achieve our objectives?

Yes.

2. Are there any aspects of command organization which you think would improve the American command structure?

No, it's sufficient

3. Do you think that a General Staff System would better accomplish the mission of the U.S. Armed Forces than the Joint Staff System currently in place?

I don't think so.

*Please read the next page
and if you have any question
please see me.*

Thank you.

Capt Yilmaz AKAR

Turkish Navy, 04 APRIL 95

South African National Defence Force

Darrell

CONTROL VERSUS EFFICIENCY: JOINT OR GENERAL STAFF**SECTION ONE: ORGANISATION OF COMMAND AUTHORITY***Does your Armed Forces have a Joint or General Staff System?*

1. The SANDF has a monolithic Command Structure from the President (as the Commander in Chief), through the Chief of the SANDF (supported by a General Staff) to the Chiefs of the four Arms of Service (supported by a Staff).

Does your Staff Organisation have command authority, does it serve as a chief military advisor to the government (as in the case of the US) or some combination of the above?

2. The Staff organisations have an administrative authority, i.e. they act in an advisory capacity to the commanders, and formulate and issue strategy as directed by the commanders, and monitor the execution of that strategy. Advice to the government on policy is presently given by the Defence Command Council, assisted and supported by the General Staff.

What is the administrative relationship between the highest military authority and the government in the political system of your country?

3. The administrative relationship is presently under redefinition due to the establishment of the Office of the Secretary of Defence. At this stage it is foreseen that the Secretary of Defence will advise the President on policy..

SECTION II: REFORM*Are there any moves to reform the command system you described above?*

4. The present transition taking place in the RSA and also in the SANDF mitigates against any major reforms in the command system. The newly-formed Secretariat of Defence might be the generator for new ideas on command relationships in the SANDF.

Does the emphasis in your system fall on civilian control or military efficiency? Do you perceive a need to change the balance? Are there any moves to change the balance?

5. At present the emphasis falls more on military efficiency, the balance will change as the newly formed Secretariat of Defence establishes itself. In fact it has already started to shift. It is, however, not foreseen that the concepts of civilian control and military efficiency will become militarily exclusive, but that a healthy balance will be strived for.

Does the balance between control and efficiency affect the completion of the mission of your Armed Forces?

6. At present the balance between control and efficiency is causing the military to redefine its strategies for the future, and its priorities iro missions and systems

SECTION THREE: THE U.S. SYSTEM

Given the American NSS and NMS, do you think the U.S. has the optimal command structure to achieve our objectives?

7. Within the constraints of a bulky political system which prevents an optimum and consistent policy, the present command structure is probably the optimum if there is a common bias between the key players.

Are there any aspects of command organisation which you think would improve the American command structure?

8. No.

Do you think that a General Staff System would better accomplish the mission of the U.S. Armed Forces than the Joint Staff System currently in place?

9. Yes, in the short term. However the same argument which influenced Nimitz at the end of WWII is probably still deeply engrained on the way the U.S. thinks it should fight tomorrow.

I would really appreciate a copy of your paper if possible.

Regards

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Rusty", followed by a period.

Defence Secretary

By Capt George Thlart

WITH THE SWEARING IN ON 11 MAY of Mr Joe Modise as Minister of Defence and on 24 May of Gen Georg Meiring as Chief of the SANDF, a new era in the military history of South Africa began. Two men from completely different backgrounds are at the helm - both committed to serve.

On 4 August there was another watershed: the appointment of Mr P.D. Steyn (Lt Gen (Ret)) as the first Defence Secretary in South Africa since 1968. This appointment heralds a major step towards civilian control of the military. SALUT interviewed Mr Steyn on 7 October.

SALUT: The establishment of a civilian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the subsequent appointment of a Defence Secretary have certain implications for the SANDF as an organisation. Can you elaborate on this and how does a Defence Secretariat in general impact upon the man or woman in uniform?

STEYN: "I believe that the man and woman in uniform might not even be aware that there is a Secretariat. The reason why I say this, is that certain functions presently being performed by the Ministry of Defence and Defence Headquarters will be reassigned to accommodate a Secretariat. The implication for the Defence Force is that it will need to share the corporate aspects of defence management with the Defence Secretariat."

SALUT: How do you see your responsibility wrt the following: political decisions, legal responsibility, accountability and transparency of defence decisions and actions.

STEYN: "There is an inherent tension between the general public and the military, because the very body they create to defend themselves, could

**"The whole truth
and nothing but
the truth."**

misuse their power and turn against the population. Various checks and balances were put in place through the creation of a Defence Secretariat.

"The Department of Defence is mandated to perform the security function for South Africa. Security policy is a combination of defence policy and foreign policy. Both aspects have a political content, because strictly speaking you will apply physical force to ensure that your country's assets and integrity are maintained.

"The Department of Defence needs to act in accordance with the directions given to it by Parliament and the Government. Hence the responsibility of the Secretariat to translate national policy into national security policy and deduce from that the appropriate defence policy.

"It provides the broad aims and limitations concerning defence action. It is also concerned to provide, with the approval of Parliament, the necessary resources to perform these options. Since you are dealing with the appropriation of resources from State coffers, there is a responsibility to ensure that the appropriated resources are applied in order to effect the necessary aims and objectives as set out in the programmes and budgets approved by Parliament.

"The state requires that we should account for the use of resources, and it is envisaged that the Defence Secretary will ultimately accept the responsibility as the accounting officer for the Department of Defence. Naturally the C SANDF

Photos: Lt Sean Bogle



who acts as the Head of the Department, will accept responsibility for the products and services as far as the Defence Department is concerned.

"This means that the Defence Secretariat will, in collaboration with Defence HQ, ensure that broad policies are translated into defence terms, and that the subsequent decisions reflect that mandate."

SALUT: What role will the Secretariat play in determining future Defence Budgets?

STEYN: "It is important to note that each financial year is considered to be a sequence of events. It starts off with the translation of national policy into the defence policy for the new cycle that is performed in collaboration with Defence HQ. The locus of control is with the Secretariat.

"The next step is to translate it into strategic plans for the Defence Department. Here the locus shifts to Defence HQ, with members of the Secretariat participating in formulating the defence strategy. It is then considered by the various Arms of Service, and they translate that into specific needs. These needs are given back to Defence HQ, where they are prioritised.

"Having prioritised the Defence Force needs, they are put together in the form of a program, spanning at least the next financial year, but indicating what is to be done in subsequent years and the budget for the next financial cycle is then drawn up. The locus of control as far as the Defence budget is concerned, is with the Defence Secretariat as they will present it to the various bodies in Parliament.

"I stress that the Defence Secretariat certainly will not define the budget in isolation."

SALUT: Are there any amendments to the Defence Act that the Secretariat would like to initiate?

STEYN: "I don't think I am qualified to answer this. However, it is clear to me that the Defence Force, besides being able to defend the country against external aggression, has collateral utility. It could perform with the same equipment which it would use for combat for other services, nationally,

regionally or even beyond international waters. The SANDF might also be required to participate in peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations in the future. One needs to consider whether the Defence Act, as it stands today, provides for such missions to be performed and to utilise resources appropriate to the Department of Defence.

"One might add that for a long period of time the Defence Force was utilised in support of the SA Police in maintaining internal stability. Consideration should be given to the provisions for this particular function in the Defence Act. I am not suggesting it should be amended: I am saying it should be considered."

SALUT: Your view on the forthcoming Truth Commission?

STEYN: "It would appear that the motivation for the Truth Commission is that to be able to forgive, you first need to understand what happened, why it happened and who did it. I would like to say that the Truth Commission would be incomplete if we stop at what happened and who did it. It is also important to consider who authorised the activities. The latter is sensitive because this would imply political responsibility for the activities performed by security forces.

"Up to this stage it would appear as if the spotlight has revolved around the activities and the actors within the defence forces and a very scant exposure as far as responsibilities and political principals are concerned.

"While it is bad to do something wrong, it is even worse when a person instructs it to be done, or if a person knows something bad is being done, but doesn't do anything to stop it being done.

"I realise that the Christian faith tells us to confess our sins and forgiveness will be granted. You cannot receive forgiveness if you don't confess your sins. However, all sinners must confess and not only a selected few.

"I would like to stress further that in most circumstances in the past, the Defence Force and its members, acted in total submissiveness to their political masters. If the Truth Commission wants

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Mr P.D. Steyn: "Whether we like it or not, South Africa in the Africa context is a major role player."



Defence Secretary

(Continued from p 19)

to do its work thoroughly, it must pass judgement on the role of the politicians as well - truth is truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth."

SALUT: *The management and restitution of land is a matter generating much interest within as well as outside the SANDF. Can you explain the current position and responsibilities of the SANDF concerning this issue?*

STEYN: "Continuous attention is being paid to the handing back of under-utilised facilities, especially land. The Department of Public Works is at present processing thousands of hectares of land handed back by the SANDF during the past year while further areas are being considered in terms of restitution claims.

"Furthermore the SANDF is aware of the need regarding land and is on record having indicated its co-operation in this regard. The crux of the matter is that training areas are necessary but in the case of restitution every effort is made to find a solution which is mutually acceptable."

SALUT: *How does the Secretariat view the SANDF's contribution towards the RDP and what does the contribution entail?*


STEYN: "It is important to reiterate that the primary mission of the SANDF is to defend and protect our sovereignty and territorial integrity. The other secondary missions include rendering service in compliance with SA's international obligations and supporting other State Departments to effect socio-economic upliftment in South Africa.

"If the SANDF is to fulfil all these obligations it is clear that it requires the necessary resources, both financial and material. We believe the SANDF can contribute significantly to the RDP, not only in terms of the employment potential, but also through the SANDF's training and development programmes.

"The SANDF is committed to the RDP. However the primary function of the SANDF is the protection of South Africa's sovereignty. Utilisation of the SANDF for secondary functions should not place this in jeopardy."

SALUT: *Several hiccups causing delays in the integration of Non-Statutory Forces into the SANDF are still being experienced. What is your view on this problem?*

STEYN: "A major factor which causes a delay in the integration process involves the human resources who can't be utilised immediately after being integrated. A soldier who received training in Uganda, Tanzania, or Eastern Europe, may be well trained, but the training differs from what is required for South African conditions.



"If a person doesn't meet the set requirements, additional or bridging training must be done. Bridging training however is not a problem. The sensitive process required to determine what a candidate can do and skills/abilities he/she possesses, is a problem.

"We also recognise the fact that most of the people never had the opportunity of proper training, education or utilisation and that there is an impatience as far as this is concerned. You cannot compress effective training and education. Everybody realises that experience is only acquired in time, especially at the levels of commanders. You require a balance as far as training, education and appropriate experience are concerned. This will certainly be imparted to members in time.

"The conflict arises where the time to meet expectations is much shorter than is required in practice."

SALUT: *The integration of all forces as stipulated in the Constitution will result in surplus manpower in terms of the affordable force design and structure. A reduction/rationalization of manpower will follow. What is your view on this?*

STEYN: "I thought that the manpower levels prior to the integration were in fact too high. It was close to a 100 000 in full-time employed members. Whether we had integrated or not, I think that with a reduction in the defence budget over a period of time, it would have been inevitable to reduce the figure.

"With integration we have added close to 22 000 new members from the TBVC countries and the NSF to present manpower figures. I maintain that we still need to reduce the figures, to a figure substantially below a 100 000. Subsequent to integration a rationalisation programme will need to be embarked upon urgently and I believe that the manpower figure of a full-time force will need to be reduced by approximately 30 per cent over a period of 5 years. We should aim for a figure of about 80 000 by the next election."

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Defence Secretary

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SALUT: *How do you see the role of women in the military?*

STEYN: "Women in the military have proven historically beyond all doubt that they form a dedicated and competent source of manpower to be reckoned with and are capable of achieving the highest results possible."

"Certain duties in modern warfare have changed due to the nature of war; certain types of warfare have become distant and impersonal; some soldiers sit behind computers or push buttons. The term 'combat' has therefore become increasingly difficult to define and does not provide the same validation of the past for precluding women from active combat musters."

"Policy implementers should, as a matter of principle, focus on the manpower mix potential and gender rather than on women alone as the weaker and feminist sex. The approach or perception to focus on gender should imply a shift away from an exclusive emphasis on women's disadvantages and differences to that of the corporate organisation of gender in all military structures, activities and processes."

"Women should be allowed to participate in the choice of their careers within the SANDF. They would therefore have to meet the same entrance requirements for the relevant training courses and be trained in the same manner as their male counterparts."

"The best candidate, on a non-discriminatory basis, should be the norm for selection."

SALUT: *Your view on the possible role that the SANDF can play beyond the borders of South Africa?*

STEYN: "I have no doubt that in the absence of purely national defence operations, and as an extension of SA foreign policy, you could utilise the defence force's collateral utility in support of the foreign policy and in pursuit of regional security."

"Whether we like it or not, South Africa in the Africa context is a major role player. It is certainly not a global economic power, but it has a far better infrastructure, and a variety of resources at the government's disposal, to pursue effective relations with regional powers."

SALUT: *The Steyn Report, a top secret investigation into the activities of Military Intelligence in 1992, has yet to be made public. What is your comment?*

STEYN: "I would like to stress firstly that the products of my investigation were not withheld in any way."

"The State President and his Cabinet took steps where in that particular case it was considered that the benefit of the doubt accrues to the state. However these allegations were given to the



Attorney-General of the Transvaal, and the Commissioner of Police with the specific purpose to conduct legal investigations."

"I submit that nothing has been withheld from the mechanisms of State and it is the prerogative of the Attorney General to make public what he has found in his investigations. I have done my duty as far as the report is concerned."

"As far as the rest of the investigation is concerned, eg organisational aspects, the Defence Act and other related Acts, wrt intelligence gathering and covert operations, the necessary steps were taken to rectify shortcomings."

SALUT: *What is the Secretariat's view on the establishment of a Defence Force Union?*

STEYN: "Let me say that I consider the aspect of labour relations in the Defence Force to be a very sensitive matter. I believe that soldiers have the right to air their grievances, and to put forward collective suggestions wrt their employment."

"Collective bargaining in the sense of labour unions doesn't have a place in the Defence Force. The weapons labour unions use (to strike) and employers use (to lock out), are not appropriate in the defence environment."

"This does not mean that I don't consider that soldiers don't have the right to advance and put forward recommendations on a collective basis to the authorities. The limitations as far as labour relations are concerned, would apply here."

SALUT: *What is your comment on the current and future developments in the Secretariat?*

STEYN: "Although the Secretariat will have a predominant civilian character in the years to come, one should not equate the concept of civil control of the defence force to be controls controlled by civilians. You should rather consider the Latin meaning of civil to be equivalent to 'state'. Civilians within the Secretariat will act as intermediaries between Parliament and the SANDF effecting civil control over the inherent power vested in the SANDF." ©

Who shall guard the guardians?

A new security concept in civil-military relations.

Compilation: SANDF Communication Service

THE PROMULGATION OF THE Interim Constitution for the Republic of South Africa, the election of a new Parliament and the establishment of a Government of National Unity brought into sharp focus the need to define the relationship between the civil and military elements and authorities in a democracy.

In most societies, the armed services enjoy a monopoly on a superior level of coercive force. In countries confronted by external aggression, the exercising of this power may be the ultimate means of protecting the sovereignty, territory and inhabitants of the state.

On the other hand, armed forces may threaten the security of citizens and undermine the government if they interfere in the political process in unconstitutional ways. All countries consequently take steps to ensure adequate control over their armed forces. This concern is captured in the question posed by the Latin poet Juvenal, "who shall guard the guardians themselves?"

The military force is therefore not an end in itself but the primary means which the civilian authority can use in defence of the country. The control measures are aimed at the integration of the military into a democratic society, strengthening mutual trust between the public and the military and promoting a sense of honour within the military in serving a democratic state.

Civil-military relations may be described as the distribution of power and influence between the armed services and the elected civilian authority. Civilian control ensures that the military operates in accordance with the Constitution and the wishes

of Parliament.

The determination to establish a civilian Ministry of Defence (MoD) with a Defence Secretary has been accepted by the NDF as a necessary change and as a challenge to secure the future.

The Interim Constitution

The Interim Constitution provides the legal and constitutional basis for the NDF and the framework for civil-military relations under the Government of National Unity. It also defines the functions of the NDF, including provisions on civilian control.

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the NDF and shall appoint the Chief of the NDF. He may, with the approval of Parliament, declare a state of national defence. He may employ the NDF in accordance with its functions but shall inform Parliament of reasons for the employment of the NDF where such employment relates to the defence of the Republic, compliance with international obligations or the maintenance of internal law and order.

However Parliament may, by resolution, terminate any such employment and additionally shall annually approve the defence budget.

The Chief of the NDF shall exercise executive command of the armed forces subject to the directions of the President during a state of national defence and in all other cases to the Minister of Defence, who shall be accountable to Parliament for the NDF.

The establishment, organisation, training, conditions of service and other matters concerning the permanent force and the part-time reserve shall be provided for by an Act of Parliament.

A joint standing committee on

defence shall be established in Parliament. It shall investigate and make recommendations on the budget, functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale and state of preparedness of the NDF, and shall perform such other functions related to parliamentary supervision of the force as may be prescribed by law.

The NDF shall perform its functions and exercise its powers solely in the national interest by upholding the Constitution, providing for the defence of the Republic and ensuring the protection of its inhabitants. It shall do so under the direction of the government and in accordance with the Constitution and any law. It shall conform to international law on armed conflict which is binding on South Africa and shall refrain from furthering or prejudicing any party political interest.

Members of the NDF shall be entitled to refuse to execute any order which would constitute an offence or would breach international law on armed conflict which is binding on South Africa.

The new Constitution does not refer specifically to a MoD but the Defence Act and other Acts of Parliament also have a bearing on civil-military relations, and will have to be revised in the light of the new Constitution.

Separation of powers

There is a fundamental division between the military and civilian spheres whatever the level of interaction between them. The armed forces should refrain from involvement in politics other than through constitutionally approved channels, whilst civilians should refrain from interfering in operational matters, the

military chain of command and the Military Discipline Code.

These respective powers are defined in law. If the democratic political system is to be maintained, the armed services should not venture beyond these boundaries. Nevertheless, the separation and hierarchy of authority between civilian and military leaders in a democracy does not imply that armed forces are merely a neutral and passive instrument for implementing executive decisions.

Senior officers will invariably attempt to advance their institutional interests in competition with other groups, and will naturally seek to contribute to the formulation of defence policy on the basis of their professional expertise.

Legality and accountability

One of the implications of the Constitution and the Defence Act is that officers are only authorised to issue orders, and soldiers are only obliged to obey them, within the framework of the law. Most importantly, the armed forces are expected to uphold the values of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights when fulfilling their responsibilities. In times of war, they are bound by international law on armed conflict.

In a democracy all state institutions are accountable to the elected civilian authority. This is particularly important in the case of the military because of its capacity for violence. The public and Parliament require some tangible assurance that the military is performing its duties according to democratically agreed policy decisions, and is not pursuing its own agenda, contrary to the public interest.

This assurance in South Africa is provided through the oversight function of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, and the political authority of the Minister of Defence.

The Minister and the government are themselves answerable to Parliament and the public for the formulation and execution of defence policy. Both the executive and the military are accountable for the disbursement of public funds according to prescribed procedures and as approved by Parliament.

Transparency

Accountability at every level requires a sufficient degree of transparency and the adequate provision of information on security and defence.

Formal mechanisms of control and oversight may be rendered ineffectual if critical information is absent. The problem is where to draw the line between the public's right to know and the need for confidentiality in the interests of national security.

There is no simple solution to this dilemma. However, there is a vast difference between an emphasis on protection of information and an emphasis on freedom of information which is guaranteed by law. In practice, Parliament determines where the emphasis lies through appropriate legislation.

Civil-military tensions

Any emerging democracy experiences tension between the military and civilian leadership. In many Latin American countries, for example, military officers believe that politicians are incapable of understanding defence and security issues, while civilians avoid interaction with the armed forces out of fear, ignorance or disinterest.

A central problem in this regard is the absence of expert skills and knowledge within the relevant civilian bodies. The resulting inexperience of ministries of defence and parliamentary defence committees gives rise to frustration within the armed forces and inhibits effective management of defence. It may also create space for soldiers to engage in politics.

Five steps in particular will be required to avoid these problems in the post-settlement South Africa, namely:

- * The introduction of education programmes on democracy and civil-military relations in the NDF to promote the development of military professionalism.
- * The members of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence and the officials who staff the MoD should be trained in military-related planning and analytical and budgeting skills.

- * The relationship between the military high command and the civilian bodies responsible for defence should be structured to ensure regular and dynamic interaction and co-operation.
- * There should be a clear definition of the respective roles and functions of the Secretariat and DHQ, and there must be accountability for decisions made.
- * There ought to be clear, unambiguous lines of command and control in the NDF.

Tension between the military and civilian leadership invariably arises in relation to the budget. Here too there is no simple solution. What is important is that the two sides are able to communicate their respective concerns to each other. It is the Minister's responsibility to balance the different interests and perspectives.

Within the NDF

A MoD Work Group, functioning under the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council and the Sub-council on Defence, researched possible models for parliamentary and civilian control over the NDF and the structure and role of the MoD.

On 20 May 1994, Mr Joe Modise ordered the implementation of a suitable structure to effect civilian control over the military. On 9 June 1994, he issued a planning directive in which he stated that the proposals advanced by the Work Group regarding the so-called "Balance Option" for an MoD, were accepted as the final objective to be achieved.

Balance option

The Work Group is striving towards a lean and clean structure and organisation, with competent leadership and staff. It must ensure political and civilian control over the NDF, while simultaneously maintaining and reinforcing military professionalism.

Lastly a spirit of civilian-military co-operation must be established and instilled into the new MoD structures.

This "Balance Option" gives the

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President a purely political function namely making decisions regarding the highest policy issues as well as supervision over the military establishment. Subordinate to him is the Minister who fulfils a purely political function. He is accountable for the overall military organisation and balances administrative and military interests.

Under the Minister, on the same hierarchical level, are military, policy and administrative components. CNDF is subordinate to the Minister and is his military advisor. The President and the Minister do not exercise military command as this is constitutionally the function of CNDF. This situation prevents the latter's involvement in political decisions.

The Defence Secretary is also subordinate to the Minister and is his civilian policy advisor. He manages the administrative divisions that execute non-military administrative functions such as finance, policy and procurement.

The collaborative relationship option between the Chief of the NDF and the Defence Secretary, found in most western democracies, was selected as being most appropriate for the South African situation. In this relationship, functions are clearly separated between civilian and military components with the latter remaining subordinate to the former.

It also recognises that certain functions under the civilian component such as policy, programmes and budget, require military collaboration. On the other hand, control of the political-military integration of defence policy with national strategy rests with the political-civilian component to ensure civilian control and to protect military professionalism.

Design

The DoD will consist of the MoD and the Arms of the Service. The MoD in turn is the corporate headquarters for the strategic management of defence, focusing on policy and control. Its task is to ensure operational effectiveness in carrying out military operations by the NDF.

The MoD will consist of the Office of the Minister of Defence, the Defence

Secretariat headed by the Defence Secretary and the Defence Headquarters headed by CNDF. Although the latter two are distinguishable organisational components, they will be physically co-located and will be organisationally interactive in the process of defence management.

The MoD is the department of state through which the elected government issues instructions to the military. It formulates national defence policy and makes the operational requirements of the armed forces known.

It is the organisation through which government policy and decisions are translated into operational plans and orders for the Arms of Service. It plans the defence programme and budget over the long term and organises the human resources, logistics and procurement requirements of the NDF.

The Defence Secretary is the principal advisor to the Minister regarding policy matters. He is a source of advice and independent counsel to the Minister and military colleagues, whilst providing a civilian balance to military issues.

His defence administration duties include being responsible for all expenditures of the DoD from the preparation of estimates through placing of contracts to final accounting and audit. He organises and carries out business with other state departments and Parliament and manages the civilian staff.

CNDF commands the NDF. He provides military advice on strategy and defence policy and overall priorities in resource allocation, programmes, current commitments and operations. He translates government policy and decisions into operational plans and directs and conducts all military operations and the work of defence staffs.

The Chiefs of the Arms of Service are responsible for the administration, support, training and employment of their respective forces in accordance with operational plans formulated by the defence staffs.

The DoD and the MoD are obliged to conform to the processes of state administration. The fundamental administration process is the annual planning, programming, budgeting and control cycle.

In the proposed MoD design, the Secretariat will formulate defence policy, including resource policy, in collaboration with DHQ. The policy

should include the envisaged defence ends and the limits within which the appropriate military ways may be sought. DHQ in turn, determines defence doctrine and strategies for the guidance of the services."

Resource policies are translated into directives for action by the Arms of Service. They determine appropriate doctrine and strategy and refer their military needs to DHQ, which then prioritises these needs and proposes plans, programmes and budgets to the Secretariat. The latter assembles the defence policy, plans, programmes and budgets for the Minister in collaboration with DHQ.

Decisions and actions relating to the execution of the approved defence programme are then screened by the Secretariat. Performance control relating to the approved defence programme and budget takes place by feedback and audit through the Secretariat.

Although the MoD functions at the policy and control level, for economic reasons certain centralised services may be provided by either the Secretariat or DHQ whichever is the more appropriate.

Workable model

A major milestone in the process was the appointment of the first Defence Secretary in South Africa since 1968. On 4 August 1994, the Minister of Defence announced that Lt Gen (Ret) P.D. Steyn had been appointed to this post with effect from 1 September 1994.

In conclusion, the project to establish the new MoD is up and running. However the designation of the Departmental Accounting Officer and the Head of the Department as well as the position of Armscor, have still to be finalised.

Studies related to the MoD structure, process, staffing and culture have been approved by the Steering Committee. Implementation planning is in progress pending approval of the MoD structure by the Public Service Commission.

The concept of civil-military relations is a very complex issue and has required and will continue to require extensive research in order to finally arrive at an acceptable and workable model for our country. ©

March 25, 1995

Naval War College
Newport, RI

Wheeler
2051

Dear Colleague:

This questionnaire is designed to study aspects of the problem of civilian control versus military efficiency in military command structure. I hope that the information you provide will lead to a better understanding of this issue.

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.

Yours truly,

Darrell Jenks

CONTROL VERSUS EFFICIENCY: JOINT OR GENERAL STAFF

SECTION ONE: ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND AUTHORITY

1. Do your Armed Forces have a Joint or a General Staff system?
2. Does your Staff Organization have command authority, administrative authority, does it serve as a chief military advisor to the government (as is the case in the U.S.) or some combination of the above?
3. What is the administrative relationship between the highest military authority and the government in the political system in your country?

SECTION TWO: REFORM

1. Are there any moves to reform the command system you described above?
2. Does the emphasis in your system fall on civilian control or military efficiency? Do you perceive a need to change the balance? Are there any moves to change the balance.
3. Does the balance between control and efficiency affect the completion of the mission of your Armed Forces?

SECTION THREE: THE U.S. SYSTEM

1. Given the American NSS and NMS, do you think the U.S. has the optimal military command structure to achieve our objectives?
2. Are there any aspects of command organization which you think would improve the American command structure?
3. Do you think that a General Staff System would better accomplish the mission of the U.S. Armed Forces than the Joint Staff System currently in place?

1) Since 1958, the French Armed Forces have had a Joint Staff system.

The President of the French Republic, directly elected since 1962, is the Chief of the Armed Forces. The Prime Minister, nominated by the President and responsible to the Parliament for the general policy, is in charge of the Defense Policy and of the coordination between the ministers (mainly the Foreign Affairs, the Interior, the Finances and the Defense).

The highest military authority is the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Chef d'Etat-major des armées : CEMA). He is under the Defense minister's administrative authority thus under the Parliament's control.

The CEMA is not only the senior military advisor to the Government, he is also directly involved in the operational chain of command. One could say that he is the only true Combatant Commander mainly concerning the authority to establish direct links with foreign military organizations.

He could rely on the Chiefs of Services (named Chief of staff of the xxx) as advisors (Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie) and on an Armed Forces Staff (Etat-major des armées: EMA).

Regarding the operational employment of forces, the EMA is organized in three main components:

- the armed forces operational center (Centre opérationnel des armées: COA): in charge of directing and monitoring the uses of military forces (located in Paris);
- the joint headquarters (Etat-major interarmées: EMIA): in charge of the operational planning with two divisions: Europe and Outside Europe (located in Creil);
- the military intelligence division (Direction du renseignement militaire: DRM): located in Creil.

The officers of the EMA come from all the Services usually after qualifying the new Joint Defense College (College interarmées de défense: CID) course (selection after a competitive examination). There is no a permanent staff corps of officers independent of the services (systeme ouvert).

The CEMA has also important administrative responsibilities. He is in charge of the joint force structure planning and budget (coordination among the services), and a major component of the EMA structure is dedicated to this part of the mission. The process of acquisition and of definition of new procurements is completely different from the US one.

2) The CEMA has clearly the operational authority upon all the forces. More than a senior advisor to the government, he is also the senior military leader involved in all the operations.

3) The CEMA is nominated by the President. He could be discharged by the President at all times. He is not linked to any political authority (mainly the Defense minister) and usually stays in charge in case of change of government or President. It is the usual law in France where the high administration servants always remain in charge.

For his administrative responsibilities, he takes his orders from the Defense minister. The last one is responsible to the Parliament. For the operational responsibility, the CEMA is responsible to the President and the Government. The National Strategy is usually decided by the President in the Superior Defense Committee (Comite superieur de defense) which gathers at least the President, the Prime Minister, the Defense, Interior, Finances and Foreign Affairs ministers.

The Parliament has always the possibility to create a inquiry commission (commission d'enquête parlementaire) and to conduct hearings, but the civilian servants or the senior military leaders have no specific rights or obligations to testify in the US way.

REFORM

There is no specific move to change the official regulations of the command system. Nevertheless, the last five years have seen an significant increase of the CEMA's powers only by the fact that Admiral Lanxade, backed with a strong political support, has chosen to fulfill more completely his role.

The creation of the planning headquarters and of a new joint staff course in place of the former services staff courses (Ecoles Superieures de Guerre xxx) are good examples of this new trend in relative power towards jointness.

The relation with the political authority has always been very specific since the Algiers putsch at the end of the Algeria war. General De Gaulle's principles regarding the political influence of military senior leaders have completely tied the Armed Forces under very strict political control and direction. For this perspective, the use of Armed forces in France since 1962 must be considered to have been mainly directed, often at a very low level of decision by the political authority. Since 1962, the French Armed Forces have been called in the media: "the great speechless". Among the examples of this De Gaulle's legacy are the fact that the French remain suspicious of the lack of political control over the SACEUR or their asks for the Partenariat for Peace to be put under control of the North Atlantic Council instead of the SACEUR.

The last years have seen also a new trend in this domain. Simply, the Defense minister has now more influence than before vis-à-vis the Foreign Affairs minister. This point can be seen in the new French position regarding NATO for instance. The Quai d'Orsay (Foreign Office) has been traditionally against French participation in the Alliance military structure. Here again, these are only trends always remaining under the same regulations and I don't see a drastic change in the French view against the integrated structure of command of NATO in the near future.

The involvement of the political leaders in the very low level details of any military forces' uses has had bad consequences regarding the efficiency problem: Use of forces outside their capacity or roles, by-pass of chain of command, on scene military blunders and more important change of the officers' souls. The flexibility of the Armed Forces to respond to any, usually not planned, request from the political authority could also be seen as a strength.


US SYSTEM


It is interesting to stress that the last important failures in national security of the two countries (Vietnam and Algeria) have left two very different legacies as to the relationship between the executive, legislative branches and the military establishment. Both avoid any possible military preeminence, but the US system put many more constraints upon the executive branch (think to the roles and missions commission for instance) which weaken the ability of the armed forces to respond to any sort of request. At the contrary the French system is very flexible and responsive, even too much.

I think that the main weakness of the US system today is this lack of flexibility. The multiplication of threats and the increasing range of the possible uses of military forces lead to a number of possibilities that can no longer be exhaustively planned at the right level by the sole military establishment (OOTW....). The lack of standing interagency work in planning and the relations between the military leaders and the civilians on the scene have not really changed in the regulations since Panama.

If in the French system, the power of the Elysée (the President's palace) is complete in defense and security policy as compared to the limited influence of the Parliament (only in budget affairs), the US system seems really sensitive to any differences of estimates between the Congress and the White House.

In the US system, the President is alone and directly in charge of the inter-agencies coordination. The French bicameral system, clearly giving this responsibility to the Prime minister, offers a great freedom to the President in his so call "domaine réservé".





Briefing on

P 1

The Federal Armed Forces Operations Centre1. Introduction

The Federal Armed Forces Operations Centre has been in existence since 1 January 1995. The purpose of this ministerial body is to assist the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, i.e. the Federal Minister of Defence, in the exercise of his command responsibilities during operations of the armed forces in crisis regions abroad, where Germany itself enjoys peacetime.

The presentation I am going to give you now is intended to provide information about:

- the Centre's genesis,
- its establishment and place in the organisational hierarchy
- its tasks and modus operandi.

2. Genesis

Only a few years ago, a capability for direct national command and control of armed forces by the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, please note again that's our Minister of Defence, was not considered necessary, least of all in peacetime.

In view of our integration into the Alliance, operational command and control is basically to be exercised by NATO commanders. In the past, operations always implied a state of defence and this means placing a large part of our forces under the command of NATO military authorities. During the last 30 years the large number of Bundeswehr missions abroad - about 120 missions world-wide from 1962 until 1990 - served the purpose of humanitarian aid and were conducted on the basis of bilateral agreements or conventions. Command and control over such missions was exercised by the Service tasked with the conduct of the mission concerned.

The global political changes since then have resulted in a reorientation of the community of States; the united, sovereign Germany became a reality. This, in turn, implied an enlargement of the tasks of the armed forces and there followed initial missions abroad in support of, or involving participation in, United Nations operations. In July 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court

declared the employment of German armed forces in the framework of collective security systems under a mandate of the United Nations to be constitutional. We must therefore proceed on the assumption, that in the future our forces may be employed in crisis regions abroad to a far greater extent and as part of more complex missions than in the past.

Even though our forces operating abroad will in most cases be placed under multinational command or integrated into international structures for crisis management, the Commander in Chief of the Armed forces will still have to be able to exercise national operational command and control and his political responsibilities at all times.

3. Establishment and Place in the Organisational Hierarchy

Soon after our first involvement in UN-missions it became clear that our capabilities to conduct such operations were poorly developed. After an interim period the following two bodies were established as command and control tools:

- the Co-ordinating Staff for Federal Armed Forces Operational Tasks
- the Federal Armed Forces Operations Centre, in short FAFOC

P 4 The Co-ordinating Staff, maybe better named a board, consists of representatives from both the civilian directorates and the single-service Staffs in FMOD Bonn; the Staff is established at the level of the Division Chiefs/Deputy Chief of Staff and is subordinate to the Chief of Staff, Federal Armed Forces. The members of the Co-ordinating Staff are authorised representatives of their single-service Staffs, the Armed Forces Staff or the mostly civilian Directorates (like Legal Affairs, Budget, etc.) and are responsible for co-ordination in their respective areas. The Co-ordinating Staff will maintain its function and is headed by the Director, Federal Armed Forces Operations Centre.

P 5 The Federal Armed Forces Operations Centre forms a part of the Armed Forces Staff and is at a level corresponding to that of a Division in the Armed Forces Staff. The director, Federal Armed Forces Operations Centre, holds the rank of Brigadier General. As has been explained earlier, he also acts as Director of the Co-ordinating Staff and has the powers of a commissioner upon whom special authority has been conferred, comparable to that of a system manager (including, inter alia, control of several functional areas). Brigadier General Hartmut Moede has been appointed as the first Director of the Federal Armed Forces Operations Centre.

The Operations Centre is subdivided into three branches which correspond to the level of the other branches in the Service Staffs and Directorates.

P 6 These are

- the Operations Planning Branch,
- the Current Operations Branch and
- the Situation Branch.

The working structure initially comprises 65 organisational posts (today 9 not yet manned) which have been made available through reorganisation and in anticipation of streamlining measures to be carried out as part of the restructuring of the Federal Ministry of Defence.

4. Tasks and Modus Operandi

The objective of assisting the Minister in the exercise of his command and control responsibility during operations of the Bundeswehr in crisis regions abroad determines the scope of functions to be performed by the Federal Armed Forces Operations Centre. This scope of functions is reflected both by the Centre's subdivision into three branches and by the corresponding allocation of individual tasks.

The **OPERATIONS PLANNING BRANCH** develops basic principles and options for operations of the Bundeswehr in crisis regions abroad at times when there is peace in Germany. These plans represent an important contribution to decisionmaking by the Political Executive Group of the Federal Ministry of Defence (Minister of Defence and 4 State Secretaries). This functional area includes the harmonisation of plans and measures with other departments of the Federal Government as well as the co-ordination and implementation of humanitarian aid and disaster relief measures carried out by the Federal Armed Forces abroad.

The **CURRENT OPERATIONS BRANCH** assists the Co-ordinating Staff in preparing decisions of the Executive Group and translating them into orders to be given to the executing commands of the armed forces and into directives to agencies of the Defence Administration. Information has to be generated, updated and made available on a continuous basis for internal purposes as well as for external use (in the Cabinet, Parliament, the press, public relations work).

The **SITUATION BRANCH** is the central point of contact of the Political Executive Group and functions as an information centre in which all information relevant to both current operations and decisionmaking by the executive group is collected, assessed and immediately submitted to the Political Executive Group. In addition, it is responsible for ensuring the administrative processing of incoming reports and the initiation of first measures, including alerting and mobilisation measures. To this end it is necessary for this branch to be manned on a continuous basis.

The basic principle applicable to the discharge of tasks is that the Federal Armed Operations Centre's actions must overlap the boundaries of its various branches; this serves to harmonise differing requirements and workloads and to establish points of main effort in the execution. It has thus been possible to keep the Centre's personnel strength to a minimum.

The core function of the Federal Armed Forces Operations Centre, however, remains the management of ministerial aspects of operations planning and current operations, but not the direct command and control of forces from out of the Federal Ministry of Defence. The tasks of the Political Executive Group in the area of current operations are ministerial tasks and do not relate to the exercise of administrative control over forces. Serving as the ministerial tool for the conduct of current operations, the Federal Armed Forces Operations Centre has neither the function of a „field headquarters“ nor that of a „command centre“, let alone a „general staff“.


Against this background it becomes clear why the previously established Co-ordinating Staff for Federal Armed Forces Operational Tasks has to be maintained alongside the Federal Armed Forces Operations Centre. As part of the Armed Forces Staff, the Centre's only function is to support the military commanders and the Political Executives and to act as a catalyst to accelerate the decision making process.

In his capacity as Director of the Co-ordinating Staff and acting on behalf of the Minister, the Director, Federal Armed Forces Operations Centre, has the authority to translate the decisions taken into orders and directives. The Director, Federal Armed Forces Operations Centre, has no authority of his own to sign orders or directives to be given to subordinate activities.

It is no doubt necessary to gather practical experience with this newly created ministerial tool. The present organisation is therefor expressly coupled to a test phase lasting until end of 1995.

END OF BRIEFING

**Armed Forces Staff
(AFS)**



**Federal Armed Forces Operations Center
(FAFOC)**

Federal Minister of Defense

Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

State Secretaries (4)

Chiefs of Staff
Services

Chief of Staff
Federal Armed Forces

Civil Directors


Coordinating Staff for

Federal Armed Forces Operational Tasks

Deputy Chiefs
of Staff
(DCOS)


Director
FAFOC


Civil
Division
Chiefs



FüZBW

5





FüZBW

6

AFS

Director
FAFOC

Operations
Planning
Branch

Current
Operations
Branch

Situation
Branch

March 25, 1995

Naval War College
Newport, RI

Dear Colleague:

This questionnaire is designed to study aspects of the problem of civilian control versus military efficiency in military command structure. I hope that the information you provide will lead to a better understanding of this issue.

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.

Yours truly,

Darrell Jenks

CONTROL VERSUS EFFICIENCY: JOINT OR GENERAL STAFF

SECTION ONE: ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND AUTHORITY

1. Do your Armed Forces have a Joint or a General Staff system? A joint staff. The HQ consists of an ^{Joint} Operational staff, a navy, army, airforce staff, Military intelligence and security and a staff support department.

2. Does your Staff Organization have command authority, administrative authority, does it serve as a chief military advisor to the government (as is the case in the U.S.) or some combination of the above?

It has both command and admin authority.

3. What is the administrative relationship between the highest military authority and the government in the political system in your country? The Supreme Commander is subordinate to the Government. (DoD) All admin from the Gov. to the services passes through the Supreme Commander.

SECTION TWO: REFORM

1. Are there any moves to reform the command system you described above?

It was reformed as late as 1994.

2. Does the emphasis in your system fall on civilian control or military efficiency? Do you perceive a need to change the balance? Are there any moves to change the balance? The reform in 1994 ensured better military efficiency as the service chiefs power was reduced in favour for the Supreme Commander. We have now full civilian control and an improved military efficiency.

3. Does the balance between control and efficiency affect the completion of the mission of your Armed Forces? No not in military ops.

SECTION THREE: THE U.S. SYSTEM

1. Given the American NSS and NMS, do you think the U.S. has the optimal military command structure to achieve our objectives?

No

2. Are there any aspects of command organization which you think would improve the American command structure?

A more formalized power base for the CJCS and JCS.

3. Do you think that a General Staff System would better accomplish the mission of the U.S. Armed Forces than the Joint Staff System currently in place?

No

Jörgen Ericsson / Sweden.

March 25, 1995

Naval War College
Newport, RI

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Yours truly,

Darrell Jenks

TO DARRELL JENKS
FROM A UTULA/NCC/FINLAND

CONTROL VERSUS EFFICIENCY: JOINT OR GENERAL STAFF

SECTION ONE: ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND AUTHORITY

1. Do your Armed Forces have a Joint or a General Staff system?

GENERAL STAFF

2. Does your Staff Organization have command authority, administrative authority, does it serve as a chief military advisor to the government (as is the case in the U.S.) or some combination of the above?

*IT HAS BOTH COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY
CHIEF MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE GOVERNMENT IS THE DEFENCE COUNCIL AND
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. SEE BOOKLET PAGE 8.*

3. What is the administrative relationship between the highest military authority and the government in the political system in your country?

*AND UNDER
CINL OF THE DEFENSE FORCES IS WORKING ON THE SAME LEVEL OF THE GOVERNMENT
AND WITH THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE SEE BOOKLET PAGE 15*

SECTION TWO: REFORM

1. Are there any moves to reform the command system you described above?

NO

2. Does the emphasis in your system fall on civilian control or military efficiency? Do you perceive a need to change the balance? Are there any moves to change the balance. *NO*

3. Does the balance between control and efficiency affect the completion of the mission of your Armed Forces? *YES*

SECTION THREE: THE U.S. SYSTEM

1. Given the American NSS and NMS, do you think the U.S. has the optimal military command structure to achieve our objectives? *YES, BUT IT IS A LITTLE BIT TOO COMPLICATED
AND VERY BYROCRATIC*

2. Are there any aspects of command organization which you think would improve the American command structure? *IT SHOULD BE MORE SIMPLIFIED AND FLEXIBLE*

3. Do you think that a General Staff System would better accomplish the mission of the U.S. Armed Forces than the Joint Staff System currently in place? *NO. IF YOU THINK ABOUT THE
MISSIONS AND ROLES OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES WHICH IT NOWADAYS
HAS, IN MY OPINION THE JOINT STAFF SYSTEM IS EXCELLENT*

March 25, 1995

Naval War College
Newport, RI

Dear Colleague:

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Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.

Yours truly,

Darrell Jenks

CONTROL VERSUS EFFICIENCY: JOINT OR GENERAL STAFF

SECTION ONE: ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND AUTHORITY

1. Do your Armed Forces have a Joint or a General Staff system?

Joint staff.

2. Does your Staff Organization have command authority, administrative authority, does it serve as a chief military advisor to the government (as is the case in the U.S.) or some combination of the above?

Seems to have

both command & administrative authority in the U.S.

3. What is the administrative relationship between the highest military authority and the government in the political system in your country?

SECTION TWO: REFORM

1. Are there any moves to reform the command system you described above?

No. The system was reorganized in 1950.

2. Does the emphasis in your system fall on civilian control or military efficiency? Do you perceive a need to change the balance? Are there any moves to change the balance.

It is civilian control, but it is not military efficiency, it is not.

3. Does the balance between control and efficiency affect the completion of the mission of your Armed Forces?

It is no danger to mission in the present.

SECTION THREE: THE U.S. SYSTEM

1. Given the American NSS and NMS, do you think the U.S. has the optimal military command structure to achieve our objectives?

2. Are there any aspects of command organization which you think would improve the American command structure?

3. Do you think that a General Staff System would better accomplish the mission of the U.S. Armed Forces than the Joint Staff System currently in place?

Instructor's Comments and Script for Phone Interview Marine Corps Colonel J. Terry (legal counsel in the JCS) 227 1137

Does the Joint Staff feel there is need to change Title 10? Specific problems? Congressional pressures?

What will be the effect of down-sizing and political pressures on organizational issues? What about roles & missions -- specifically U.N., peacekeeping and humanitarian operations -- OOTW?

Are the issues of sufficiency of the Chairman's input and authority personality driven? If so, does it make any sense for us to do more tinkering?

Give G-N time before tinkering. The system and process are still changing -- Senior officers who have received JPM&E are just now moving up. What will be the effect? Will their proper execution make the current system work?

To what extent has G-N increased the power of the Chairman? Is power now too centralized?

Crucial reform issue -- the problem is not strictly organizational, but one of execution (role of JOPES).

G-N: Driven by perception that Service rivalries hampered efficiency. Changes possible without jeopardizing civilian control or the presentation of differing views.

Is the current system still 'broken'? Does it change every time Congress passes appropriating legislation?

Does the integrated priority list process give CINCs sufficient input into military strategy?

Is parochialism always bad? How does Admiral Owens feel? Are we moving towards a de facto general staff system?

Will making the Chairman more powerful resolve problems that resulted from not giving the people who led military operations the freedom to do what they needed to do?

4/24/95 Telcon. JCS Staff Lt. Col. Rosen/DJenks Reform of the JCS

No initiatives for change from the Joint Staff perspective. There are some internal policies which may result in recommendations, i.e. TQM.

Chairman keeps getting additional duties, added by statute and DoD directive, in spite of the fact that the Joint Staff personnel has been cut by 20%, while operational requirements have increased. The focal point for all military operations has become the Joint Staff, which as a result of G-N is now in the position the Services were in before 1986.

There are all sorts of initiatives, but no recommended legislation. The next step would seem to be the elimination of the Service SEcretariats, which duplicate functions of the staff of the JCS.

There are no formal proposals to move towards a General Staff System, but we are waiting for the report of the Roles and Missions Commission, which is due out shortly.

Though there are no formal initiatives, Roosen has heard that there are congressional moves to propose elimination of the Service Secretariats. There may be bills pending: a check of LEXUS should reveal the status of any pending legislation on this topic.

There is always fine tuning and tweaking going on, mostly internal to the Joint Staff.

CHAIRMAN HAVE TOO MUCH POWER?

Roosen has only been there since last summer. So far no initiatives to limit the Chairman's authority, if anything it is growing both de facto and de jure. DoD directives keep piling on responsibilities, as do Congressional statutes. We just finished compiling a 9 page list of the Chairman's responsibilities -- single space tics. Many by statutes and directives (ordered by SecDef).

PENDING ISSUES There are always contentions between the Services, the Joint Staff and the Chairman, the CINCs.

--SOCOM and Service tensions. SOCOM is not like any of the other CINCs -- The Army cut reserve training

budget for SOCOM related activities unilaterally.

--J-1 and the Services -- How to task for augmentation to CINCs, individual TDYs.

There is resistance any time the Chairman tells the Services to do something -- resistance by the Services to the Chairman's instructions.

The issue of reform has not gone away, and will remain as more and more responsibilities move to the Chairman. the most recent salient example is that of oversight of PFP program -- Congress tasked the Joint Staff with this responsibility.

CHAIN OF COMMAND ISSUES

Operations go through the Joint Staff, not Service Chiefs. Roosen's personal opinion - the Service Staffs are irrelevant. Roosen has heard that the Marine Corps proposes to limit the size of the Joint Staff.

There are ambiguities in the law at the margins. When Roosen took the job he thought that 9 years after passage of G-N the issues would have been resolved - not so! The Service Secretariats are next on the block.

More contentious issues-- roles and missions (have to wait for Commission report).

--assignment of forces

--SOCOM

--deployment of forces -- only by Secdef, or can it be done, 'less formally'?

--Promotion of Joint Staff Officers under Title 4 JDAL. Service objection to number of positions -- the Services feel that too many are keyed to Joint Staff Officer positions.

Every Service now has in-house G-N expert. HQ Marine Corps has Mr. Meermach in the legal Office. Knows law well, and represents 'client' (the Marine Corps) well! As does Roosen for his 'client' (Joint Staff).

Check with John King, JCS rep. at NWC. Army JAG.